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Abstract
Demand Response (DR) is a program designed to match supply and demand
by modifying consumption profile. Some of these programs are based on
economic incentives, in which, a user is paid to reduce his energy require-
ments according to an estimated baseline. Literature review and practice
have shown that the counter-factual models of employing baselines are vul-
nerable for gaming. Classical solutions of mechanism design require that
agents communicate their full types which result in greater difficulties for
its practical implementation. In this paper, a novel contract is developed
to induce individual rationality (voluntary participation) and asymptotic
incentive-compatibility (truthfulness) through probability of call, where an
agent does not require to report the marginal utility. In this approach, a con-
sumer only announces the baseline and reduction capacity, given a payment
scheme that includes cost of electricity, incentive price, and penalty caused
by any deviation between self-reported and actual energy consumption. The
aggregator decides randomly what users are called to perform the energy re-
duction. As result, asymptotic truth-telling behavior in incentive-based DR
is managed by the aggregator through the probability of call for each agent.
Mathematical proofs and numerical studies are provided to demonstrate the
properties and advantages of this contract in limiting gaming opportunities
and in terms of its implementation.
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1. Introduction
DR is one of the most vital parts of the future smart grid (Zhu et al.,
2013; Bloustein, 2005; Su and Kirschen, 2009). DR is a tool to improve the
demand profile, that is, to control the noncritical loads Buber et al. (2013)
at the residential Bizzozero et al. (2016), commercial and industrial levels
for matching supply and demand. There are different ways to active DR in
the electric power. Broadly defined, controllable programs (Diaz et al., 2017)
and indirect methods (Vuelvas and Ruiz, 2017) are found as DR solutions,
which are tools implemented by system operator (SO) to balance the demand
with power generation by means of load modification. In particular, indirect
methods are performed by changing energy price or giving an incentive pay-
ment.
In incentive-based DR, participating agents are paid for diminishing their en-
ergy consumption from established baseline (e.g. Peak Time Rebates, Inter-
ruptible Capacity Program and Emergency DR). Literature and practice have
exhibited that consumers have incentives to alter their consumption patterns
and baseline setting in order to increase their well-being, see e.g. (Zhou et al.,
2017; Muthirayan et al., 2016; Severin Borenstein, 2014; Vuelvas and Ruiz,
2015, 2017).There are three key components of an incentive-based DR pro-
gram: 1) A baseline, 2) A payment scheme and 3) Terms and conditions
(such as penalties) (Muthirayan et al., 2016).
The baseline is defined as a method of estimating the power consumption
that would have been consumed by demand in the absence of DR Deng et al.
(2015). This quantity is often based on the average historical consumption
of a consumer or a customer group on days that are similar to the forthcom-
ing DR event. Therefore, a counter-factual model is developed to estimate
the customer baseline. In Mohajeryami et al. (2016), some methods are pre-
sented to estimate the customer baseline. Baseline model error associated
with DR parameter estimates are studied in (Mathieu et al., 2011). In ad-
dition, the performance of DR baselines are studied and new methods are
proposed to obtain a reasonable compensation for consumers in (Faria et al.,
2013; Wijaya et al., 2014; Antunes et al., 2013). Furthermore, in (Chao,
2011), the critical facts on the selection of customer baseline are highlighted,
showing that counter-factual forecasts are vulnerable for gaming and could
result in illusory demand reduction, then author proposes a baseline focus-
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ing on administrative and contractual approaches in order to get an efficient
DR.
Given the fact that the incentive-based DR presents gaming concerns, a
mechanism design or a contract is required to address these problems in
order that an agent reveals his truthful baseline and private information.
Some solutions for DR are found in the literature by designing programs in
a market framework. A revelation mechanism is developed in (Ramos et al.,
2013), which requests agents to select the best choice for themselves among
a menu of incentives in electricity markets. In (Bitar and Xu, 2013), a for-
ward market is proposed, where users permit a deferred service in exchange
for a reduced price of energy in order to manage the variability in supply
from renewable generation, as well, this mechanism shows that prices are
incentive-compatible. In (Mhanna et al., 2014), a two-stage mechanism is
devised to share the cost of electricity among participants based on their day-
ahead allocations. This mechanism is asymptotically incentive-compatible
and ex-ante weakly budget balanced under certain conditions. Furthermore,
a methodology is developed in (Haring and Andersson, 2014) for implement-
ing microeconomic theory on contract designs for ancillary services in which
incentive compatibility and individually rational are guaranteed in the pres-
ence of imperfect information between the consumers and the aggregator. In
addition, in (Okajima et al., 2014), two kinds of mechanisms are applied for
a dynamic day-ahead market based on DR. One is the Vicrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG), which is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational. An-
other mechanism is Arrow, d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, which is Bayesian
(interim) incentive compatible and budget balanced.
In addition, other solutions are found in literature at the level of consumer
and aggregator. In (Ma et al., 2017), a truthful mechanism is designed that
uses a reward-bidding approach where the mechanism adopts a fixed penalty
for non-response for all selected agents, and consumers are selected in in-
creasing order of their minimum acceptable rewards given the penalty. A
model of consumer behavior in response to incentives is designed in a mech-
anism design framework in (Zhou et al., 2017), where aggregator collects the
price elasticities of the demand as bids and then it selects the most sus-
ceptible users to incentives such that an aggregate reduction is obtained.
In (Fahrioglu and Alvarado, 2001), truthful contracts are designed for DR,
which maximize the power utility company benefit function subject to indi-
vidual rationality and incentive-compatible constraints. A VCG mechanism
applied in DR is presented in (Samadi et al., 2012), where the authors ver-
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ify some properties such as efficiency, user truthfulness, and nonnegative
transfer. However, there are several major obstacles implementing VCG
mechanisms, see e.g. (Roughgarden, 2016). Other work of VCG approach is
found in (Meir et al., 2017). The authors of (Muthirayan et al., 2016) pro-
pose an incentive-based DR mechanism, where each consumer reports his
baseline consumption and his marginal utility to the aggregator. Deviations
are penalized, hence, the true estimation is found. A linear utility function
is assumed for each user. Furthermore, it is shown individual rationality
for every consumer. In (Chen et al., 2012), a game theoretic DR strategy
is developed, which consists of a distributed load prediction system by the
participation of users that guarantee cheat-proof (truth-telling) behavior.
Finally, in (Dobakhshari and Gupta, 2016; Dobakshari and Gupta, 2016), a
contract between a customer and an aggregator for incentive-based DR is
proposed. This mechanism is composed of two parts: a share of aggregator
profit and a compensation paid to customer due to load reduction.
In this paper, a novel contract is addressed by the probability of call for each
participant consumer. A user submits his baseline and reduction capacity.
This contract does not require marginal utility information as in traditional
mechanisms, which could be a private parameter difficult to estimate by a
consumer. Accordingly, agents bid two quantities in terms of energy, then
this contract is a more intuitive procedure and can be suitable to be imple-
mented in practice. In this approach, the main goal of the aggregator is to
select randomly which participant agents are called to performed DR. The
contribution is summarized as follows:
• The optimal decision problem is presented by 2-stage contract. The
result is obtained backward in time to find optimal choice that user
faces at each time. Theoretical analysis and numerical studies are pro-
vided to demonstrate the benefits and properties. The outcome shows
that the contract is individually rational, incentive compatibility on the
reported reduction capacity and asymptotic incentive compatibility on
the reported baseline.
• In this contract, aggregator does no require to estimate the customer
baseline, then it only calls randomly participant consumers with a prob-
ability of call close to zero in order to obtain truthful behavior by de-
mand side. In addition, There is no need for agents to inform their full
types to achieve good performance in properties of this mechanism.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
preliminary setting. In Section III, the problem statement is explained. In
Section IV, the proposed contract is formulated. In Section V, consumer’s
optimal choices are developed. In Section VI, Numerical optimization results
are shown. In Section VII, a final discussion is presented. Conclusions are
presented in Section VIII.
2. Setting
This part presents definitions, assumptions and preliminary consider-
ations. Incentive-based DR program is managed by an aggregator that
requests customers to curtail demand in response to an economic incen-
tive. There are I participant consumers. The set of users is denoted by
I = {1, 2, ..., I}. Some concepts and conditions are defined as follows.
The decision maker’s preferences are specified by giving a smooth utility func-
tion G(qi; bi), that depicts the level of satisfaction obtained by a user as a
function of qi, which is the energy consumption and bi is the baseline, which is
a quantity only known by each consumer i ∈ I. The utility function satisfies
the following properties as proposed in Chen et al. (2012); Vuelvas and Ruiz
(2017, 2015):
Property 1. G(qi; bi) is assumed as a concave function with respect to qi.
This implies that the marginal benefit of users is a nonincreasing function,
i.e., d
2G(qi;bi)
dq2
i
≤ 0.
Property 2. Utility function is nondecreasing. Therefore, the marginal ben-
efit is nonnegative dG(qi;bi)
dqi
≥ 0.
Property 3. G(qi; bi) is zero when the consumption level is zero, G(0) = 0.
The energy price p is given. Then, the following definition are stated.
Definition 1. The energy total cost is pii(qi) = pqi.
Definition 2. The payoff function without DR is defined as Ui(qi; bi) =
G(qi; bi)−pii(qi), which indicates the user benefit of consuming qi for a certain
time.
Definition 3. The rational behavior of a consumer that maximizes the payoff
function Ui(qi; bi) is given by, q
∗
i = bi. This result is found by solving the
optimization problem q∗i = argmaxqi∈{0,qmax,i} Ui(qi; bi). Where qmax,i is the
maximum allowable consumption value by user i.
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Assumption 1. Under previous properties, the utility function can be ap-
proximated by a second order polynomial. User’s utility function is assumed
as,
G(qi; bi) =
{
−γi
2
q2i + [γibi + p]qi 0 ≤ qi ≤ bi +
p
γi
p2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
+ pbi qi > bi +
p
γi
where γi is the marginal utility of consumer i.
Therefore, given Assumption 1 and Definition 3, the optimal payoff Ui(qi; bi)
for an agent i that does not participate in DR is equal to
γib
2
i
2
(1)
Assumption 2. Each consumer i has a maximum limit of energy consump-
tion qmax,i. A reasonable hypothesis is that the maximum limit is greater than
the saturation limit established in Assumption 1, i.e., qmax,i > bi + p/γi
3. Problem statement
In a wholesale electricity market, according to the available energy sources,
aggregated demand information and market prices, SO could require a de-
mand reduction during peak times. Therefore, SO request a DR process
through an aggregator. Fig. 1 shows the participant agents involved in DR.
Aggregator can participate in the market by bidding aggregated reduction
capacity to the system. After the market clearing, SO sends a demand reduc-
tion requirement to aggregator. Then, by means of contracts with consumers,
aggregator activates DR programs.
In an incentive-based DR approach, aggregator encourages to each par-
ticipant diminishing the energy pattern according to an economic signal.
Mathematically,
Definition 4. Let p2 be the rebate price received by the user due to energy
reduction in peak periods. The incentive is defined as pii,2(qi; bˆi) = p2(bˆi−qi)+.
Where (·)+ = max(·, 0) and the superscript ˆmeans declared information.
Therefore, bˆi is the baseline announced by user.
Assumption 3. In order to encourage the energy cutback by demand side.
The incentive price is assumed greater or equal than energy price, that is,
p2 ≥ p.
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Generators
Contracts
Figure 1: Participant agents.
In order to obtain an efficient DR service, aggregator requires that each
agent reports his true private information (or estimated data on non-altered
past consumption) and selects his consumption level according to his prefer-
ences, i.e.:
qoi = argmax
qi∈{0,qmax,i}
Ui(qi; bi)− pii(qi) + rpii,2(qi; bˆi) (2)
with bˆi = bi and ri a binary variable that indicates if user i is called to
participate in DR. In other words, truth-telling behavior is desired when
incentive-based DR is required during peak times of electrical demand. Under
assumption that consumers behave as truthful agents, consumer’s optimal
choice is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal consumption qoi of a user that participates in
an incentive-based DR, given truthful report (bˆi = bi) is:
qoi =
{
bi ri = 0
(bi −
p2
γi
)+ ri = 1
Case ri = 0 follows from Definition 3. Case ri = 1 is derived from
optimality conditions of problem (2) at each interval of G(qi; bi), and selecting
the global maximizer (see Vuelvas and Ruiz (2017)).
Notice that Prop. 1 is the consumer’s ideal behavior. However, in prac-
tical fashion, a user can alter his reported baseline bˆi, in particular, he could
bid qmax,i because there is no penalty to increase his well-being. Furthermore,
in DR programs like Peak Time Rebate where the baseline is estimated, a
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consumer modifies as well the average consumption at similar previous time
resulting in the problem described in Severin Borenstein (2014), for the case
when p2 > p, he consumes up to qmax,i during the baseline setting period (see
Vuelvas and Ruiz (2017, 2015)). Therefore, in this paper, a contract between
the aggregator and each consumer is proposed to induce asymptotic incentive
compatible (truthfulness) and individually rational (voluntary participation)
properties.
4. Contract based on probability of call
In this section, the proposed contract is described according to a new
payment scheme based on probability of call. Fig. 2 shows the timeline
to hold the contract between the aggregator and an agent. The agreement
process is described below.
• First, SO informs to aggregator what net demand reduction is required
at a certain peak time or the aggregator could participate as new player
within electricity market. Then aggregator announces energy cost p and
incentive price p2 (Also, this quantity works as penalty for deviation).
• According to all prices, at the time t− 1, participant consumers (that
signed the contract) report the baseline bˆi and their reduced energy
consumption qˆi if they are called.
• Next, aggregator determines the subset of agents that are called to
participate in DR subject to SO requirement and probability of call for
each participant, i.e., aggregator decides the binary variable ri.
• Later, at the time t, each user receives his value of ri and chooses
his actual consumption level qi during the event. This consumption is
observed by the aggregator.
• Finally, the payment is made by the aggregator for called users.
The proposed payment scheme of the contract is presented as follows:
Definition 5. Let pirii,3(qi; bˆi, qˆi) be the aggregator payment scheme under
incentive-based DR:
pirii,3(qi; bˆi, qˆi) =
{
pmax(bˆi, qi) ri = 0
pqi − p2(bˆi − qi)+ + p2 |qi − qˆi| ri = 1
8
SO
Aggregator Consumers
announces p and p2
report qˆi and bˆi
defines ri
decide qiobserves demand
makes the payment
t− 1
t
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
4.
Figure 2: Timeline of the contract.
According to Definition 5, note that if a consumer is not called to partic-
ipate in DR, then he must pay the maximum between his reported baseline
or actual energy consumption. This payment is inspired by the concept of
”buy the baseline” Chao (2011). Otherwise, if he is required to reduce his
energy requirement, then he receives an incentive of p2(bˆi − qi) and must
pay the energy cost and a penalty with the same price of the incentive if his
actual consumption differs from qˆi. Given the payment scheme established
in Definition 5, thus the contract is settled as a 2-stage procedure:
Stage 1) Given the prices p and p2, each consumer reports bˆi and qˆi to ag-
gregator.
Stage 2) Aggregator determines which users are called to participate in DR
by means of the variable ri. Each agent decides his actual energy consump-
tion qi according to the aggregator decision ri.
Finally, an important and logical rule of this contract is stated in the follow-
ing hypothesis.
Assumption 4. The reported baseline must be greater or equal than reported
energy consumption under DR, i.e, bˆi ≥ qˆi.
In the next Section, consumer’s optimal decision under this proposed
contract is determined by mathematical proofs. These results are vital for
designing the aggregator role.
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5. Consumer’s optimal choices
For the previous DR contract, a consumer faces the problem of deciding
what to communicate to aggregator and how much energy qi to consume.
Given p and p2, a rational user finds bˆi, qˆi and qi such that his profits Ji will
be maximized:
[bˆi
∗
, qˆi
∗, q∗i ] = argmax
qi,bˆi,qˆi∈{0,qmax,i}
Ji = E(G(qi; bi)− pi
ri
i,3(qi; bˆi, qˆi)) (3)
The superscript ∗ means optimal decisions.
Problem (3) is a two-stage stochastic programming formulation. The pro-
posed solution is found by solving backward in time (Rajagopal et al., 2013).
At the time t (see Fig. 2), user maximizes the actual energy consumption qi
for each case of ri, that is, finds the optimal solution q
∗
i,ri=0
and q∗i,ri=1, given
bˆi and qˆi.
[q∗i,ri=0, q
∗
i,ri=1
] = argmax
qi,ri∈{0,qmax,i}
G(qi,ri; bi)− pi
ri
i,3(qi,ri ; bˆi, qˆi) (4)
At the time t − 1, consumer determines the best information bˆi
∗
and qˆi
∗ to
report, knowing the optimal choices q∗i,ri=0 and q
∗
i,ri=1
that he can take at
consumption time t and facing the uncertainty in ri.
(5)
[bˆi
∗
, qˆi
∗] = argmax
bˆi,qˆi∈{0,qmax,i}
E(G(q∗i,ri; bi)− pi
ri
i,3(q
∗
i,ri
; bˆi, qˆi))
= argmax
bˆi,qˆi∈{0,qmax,i}
pri[G(q
∗
i,ri=1
; bi)− pi
ri=1
i,3 (q
∗
i,ri=1
; bˆi, qˆi)]
+ [1− pri][G(q
∗
i,ri=0
; bi)− pi
ri=0
i,3 (q
∗
i,ri=0
; bˆi, qˆi)]
where pri = pri(ri = 1) is the probability of call.
The optimal decision problem is described in details as follows.
5.1. Second-stage of consumer’s decision
The problem (4) is solved for each case of the binary variable ri. The
solutions are presented in Theorems 1 and 2. The proofs are shown in
Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
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Theorem 1. The optimal consumption q∗i,ri for the signal ri = 0 of a partic-
ipant consumer in the proposed contract, given the problem (4), is:
q∗i,ri=0 =


bi 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi strategyA
bˆi bi < bˆi ≤ bi + p/γi strategy B
bi + p/γi bi + p/γi < bˆi ≤ qmax,i strategy C
According to Theorem 1, there are three strategies that depend on the
reported baseline. For instance, if a consumer informs a baseline above his
preferences and below his saturation limits (i.e. strategy B), then, his best
choice is to consume what he reported in the previous stage.
Theorem 2. The optimal consumption q∗i,ri for the signal ri = 1 of a partic-
ipant consumer in the proposed contract, given the problem (4), is:
q∗i,ri=1 =


bi bi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, bi ≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i strategy U
qˆi bi −
p2
γi
≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, bi −
2p2
γi
≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ bi strategy V
qˆi α ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
p2
γi
, bi −
2p2
γi
≤ qˆi ≤ bi −
p2
γi
strategyW
(bi −
p2
γi
)+ bi −
2p2
γi
≤ bˆi ≤ α, bi −
2p2
γi
≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
p2
γi
strategyX
(bi −
p2
γi
)+ 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
3p2
2γi
, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
2p2
γi
strategyY
(bi −
2p2
γi
)+ bi −
3p2
2γi
≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi −
2p2
γi
strategyZ
with α =
γib
2
i
2p2
− γibi qˆi
p2
− bi +
γi qˆi
2
2p2
+ 2qˆi +
p2
2γi
.
Similarly, Theorem 2 presents the consumer’s optimal decisions conform-
ing to bˆi and qˆi. In this case, notice that the strategies that enable an energy
reduction are strategiesX , Y and Z. Next, these results are substituted in
(5) in order to find profit-maximizing behavior.
5.2. First-stage of consumer’s decision
The solution of problem (5) is written in Theorem 3. The proof is de-
scribed in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. Given q∗i,ri from Theorems 1 and 2, then the optimal reports bˆi
∗
and qˆi
∗ for (5) are:
bˆi
∗
=
{
prip2
γi(1−pri)
+ bi 0 ≤ pri ≤
p
p2+p
qmax,i
p
p2+p
≤ pri ≤ 1
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qˆi
∗ =
(
bi −
p2
γi
)
+
Theorem 3 presents the optimal reported decisions for rational consumers
in this contract. With respect to the reported baseline bˆi
∗
, if the probability
of call pri is less than threshold p/(p2+p), then an agent informs his true base-
line bi added to p2/γi which is multiplied by the expression pri/(1− pri). For
instance, if pri is close to zero then the best choice is to announce bi. There-
fore, the term pri/(1 − pri) limits the misreporting by means of pri. Note
that the probability of call is limiting gaming opportunities for the baseline
under this agreement. Otherwise, when a user knows that his probability of
call exceeds the threshold thus the best strategy is to report his maximum
energy allowed qmax,i. In addition, a consumer must inform the energy re-
duction qˆi, in this affair, the truth information is obtained independently of
the probability of call according to Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. The optimal expected profit J∗ is:
J∗i =


b2i γi
2
+
prip
2
2
2γi(1−pri)
0 ≤ pri ≤
p
p2+p
p2
2γi
+ bip− pqmax,i +
b2i γi
2
−
p2pri
2γi
+
p2
2
pri
2γi
−bipri − bip2pri + pqmax,ipri + p2qmax,ipri
p
p2+p
≤ pri ≤ 1
Corollary 1 is found by substituting solution of Theorem 3 in Eq. (3). It
is easy to prove that the optimal expected profit J∗ is an increasing function
w.r.t. pri. Relevant cases are presented when the probability of call is lower
than the threshold p/(p2+p). Notice that when pri goes to zero, the optimal
expected profit under DR is b2iγi/2, which is the same value for a user that
does not participate in DR as indicated by (1).
Corollary 2. The optimal consumption q∗i,ri, by replacing the best reports
given in Theorem 3, is:
q∗i,ri =


prip2
γi(1−pri)
+ bi ri = 0, 0 ≤ pri ≤
p
p2+p
bi + p/γi ri = 0,
p
p2+p
≤ pri ≤ 1
(bi −
p2
γi
)+ ri = 1, 0 ≤ pri ≤ 1
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Lastly, the optimal decision q∗i,ri is determined by using Theorem 3 in the
second-stage defined in Eq. 4. On the one hand, if an agent is not called
to participate in DR and the probability of call is below the threshold, then
he should consume the energy he reported in order to earn his best profit.
However, if pri is above of the threshold p/(p2+ p) when ri = 0, so a rational
consumer uses energy to saturation point which is bi + p/γi. On the other
hand, if a user is called to participate ri = 1, then his best choice is to
consume what he reported in the previous stage.
5.3. Contract properties
Finally, contract properties are direct consequences of previous results.
These features are listed below.
Corollary 3. Individually rational (voluntary participation): a user that
participates in this approach obtains a profit at least as good as he does not
sign the DR contract.
An important requirement to encourage affiliation to the contract or
mechanism is the property stated in Collorary 3. This results follows by
comparing Corollary 1 and expression (1). For rational users, other income
can be incorporated into their economic activities by participating in pro-
posed settlement.
Corollary 4. Incentive compatibility on the reported energy consumption
under DR: a consumer informs the truthful consumption under DR according
to his preferences.
Corollary 5. Asymptotic incentive compatibility on the reported baseline:
as the probability of call tends to zero, the consumer’s optimal strategy is to
declare bˆi = bi.
Corollaries 4 and 5 establish the truthful properties in this contract.
These features are understood by reviewing Theorem 3 and Corollary 2.
A rational user bids qˆi
∗ = q∗i,ri=1 guarantying to maximize his profit. Addi-
tionally, if pri −→ 0 then the best choice is to announce bˆi
∗
= q∗i,ri=1, i.e.,
asymptotic truthfulness.
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6. Illustrative example
In this section, simulation results are presented to illustrate the optimal
behavior of a user when he is participating in the proposed contract. The
retail price is p = 0.26 $/kWh (based on peak summer rate in 10/1/16 by
Pacific Gas and Electric Company in San Francisco, California), true baseline
is bi = 8 kWh, the incentive/penalty price is p2 = 0.3 $/kWh, the marginal
utility is γi = 0.05 $/kWh
2 and the maximum allowable consumption is
qmax,i = 16 kWh. Randomness ri has been created to simulate consumer’s
optimal choice according to the probability of call. A Monte Carlo simulation
is performed with 1000 realizations of ri for each value of probability in order
to check the results.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
pri
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Consumer's optimal choices (kWh)
bˆi
∗
q∗i,ri=0
qˆi
∗
q∗i,ri=1
Figure 3: Optimal consumer’s choice.
The problem (3) is solved through extensive simulations for different val-
ues of probability pri to find rational decisions. The consumer’s optimal
choices are depicted in Fig. 3. As regards the reported baseline, the truth-
fulness is being lost as the probability of call increases which is described
by Theorem 3. For this example, the threshold p/(p + p2) in the probabil-
ity of call is 0.46. Above the threshold, the worst condition of gaming are
found because a user announces his maximum energy allowed and in order
to achieve the highest income, as well, he really consumes until his energy
saturation assuming that he is not called to participate in DR. Additionally,
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note that the agent actually declares what he is willing to reduce according
to his preferences qˆi
∗ = q∗i,ri=1 irrespective of the probability of call because
he suffers a penalty for deviations of his self-reported consumption when he
is called to DR program.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
pri
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
bˆ i
/b
i
Figure 4: Percentage of gaming limitation on the reported baseline.
Furthermore, Fig. 4 depicts the reported baseline normalized by the true
one in order to establish the percentage of limitation on gaming opportunities.
For instance, an aggregator calls a group of agents with a probability of call
equals to pri = 0.1 then rational consumers have incentives to overreport the
baseline through the increase of 11% due to the expression p2pri/(γi(1−pri))
given by Theorem 3 which is added to his true baseline. Accordingly, an
aggregator does not know the values of γi for all agents i, however, it can
limit their gaming behavior by means of the probability of call.
The intuition behind these findings is that, on the one hand, whether
the participant user is not called then he must pay the maximum between
his reported baseline and actual consumption, thus, misreporting will cause
a loss of his profit. On the other hand, if the consumer is called, hence he
should reduce his energy consumption according to what he committed at
previous Stage so that the penalty does not apply. Moreover, consumer’s
optimal decisions are coherent with Prop. 1 given a probability of call close
to zero. Therefore, asymptotic incentive compatibility is induced by means
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of this contract.
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Figure 5: Optimal expected profit of a consumer.
Fig. 5 shows the optimal expected profit of a consumer according to
the probability of call. This curve is increasing with pri and two parts are
distinguished as is stated in Collorary 1. The first one, a smooth growth is
exhibited for pri ∈ [0, 0.46] then a significant rise in benefits is presented for
pri > 0.46 as the second part. The point of change between the two parts is
presented in the threshold probability of call, which is coherent with Fig. 3.
Furthermore, the payoff when an agent does not participate in DR is given by
expression (1) that for this case is $1.6. In Fig. 5, the lowest optimal expected
profit occurs in pri = 0 with a payoff of $1.6, hence, the user’s benefit when
he participates in this contract is at least as good as when he does not join in
the incentive-based DR program. Lastly, voluntary participation, also known
as individual rationality, is motivated in the proposed contract.
Finally, variations in the preference γi are analyzed in this contract. In
Fig. 6, the marginal utility γi is changed given fixed probability of call and
prices, in order to study the effects on the fluctuation of this consumer’s pri-
vate preference. For pri = 0.1, the optimal reported baseline bˆi
∗
is equal to
the actual energy consumption q∗i,ri=0 if he is not called for DR and also, as
γi increases, the reported baseline tends to the true baseline bi. In addition,
reported and actual energy consumption are the same qˆi
∗ = q∗i,1, which is
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Figure 6: consumer’s optimal choice and optimal profit by varying private preference γi
given the probability of call pri = 0.1.
consistent to Theorem 3 and Corollary 2. In summary, as electrical energy
preference γi rises for a probability of call beneath of threshold value, over-
bidding in the baseline and reduction capacity diminish; also, the reported
information and the actual consumption values hold the same behavior.
Lastly, Fig. 7 presents the optimal profit by changing γi. The curve trend
is an increasing function with respect to γi due to preliminary assumptions
of the consumer behavior. Note that the property of voluntary participation
is guaranteed irrespective of the consumer’s preferences since a rational user
(profit-maximizing) obtains greater economic profit by joining in DR rather
than not participating.
7. Discussion
In practical fashion, an industrial, commercial or residential consumer is
not thinking in terms of marginal utility when he is dealing with DR. Most of
the solutions found in literature, the agreement or mechanism requires that
agents reveal all their types including the private value γi in order to settle
the problem. It is most intuitively that a user with smart metering devices
can know or estimate how much energy he consumes during a certain hour
of the day, thus he could announce information to the aggregator in terms
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Figure 7: Optimal profit by varying private preference γi given the probability of call
pri = 0.1.
of kWh. For instance, if an industrial consumer is willing to turn off some
machines during DR event then he can determine his possible reduction of
energy through knowledge of the equipment power. Therefore, a user with
the suitable technology that analyzes the behavior of each appliance can take
his decisions and participate in incentive-based DR programs by knowing his
preferences of energy consumption. One of the advantages of the proposed
contract is actually that the required information of participants is in energy
units. Although this new approach includes the analysis of marginal utility,
the contract can be implemented without this knowledge.
Traditional incentive-based DR programs rely on contractual models to
estimate baseline in order to make the payments to participant users. This
approach is vulnerable for gaming since consumers increase their energy con-
sumption during baseline setting period harming the system reliability. The
proposed contract induces an asymptotic incentive compatible property on
the self-reported baseline by participant agents since the marginal utility is
not available to settle the contract. In spite of this agreement feature, a
regular consumer is not taking decisions with stochastic optimization tools,
therefore, whether the aggregator keeps the probability of call close enough
to zero then the truth-telling behavior is obtained under this novel approach.
According to Corollary 4, incentive compatibility on the reported energy
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consumption under DR is guaranteed due to the form of the penalty function
which is given by a expression with absolute value, i.e., p2 |qi − qˆi|. At first
sight, it might seem that this penalty is very strict. Although, it is possible
to relax this condition through tolerance or hysteresis band in order to in-
corporate some flexibility in the contract and that agents do not feel so rigid
when consuming energy at Stage 2 if they are called to participate in DR.
The final goal is to design a contract that could be implementable and elicit
truthful properties for improving part of the power management in a smart
grid.
8. Conclusions
In this paper was proposed a DR contract that induces voluntary partic-
ipation and asymptotic truthful properties based on the probability of call
for users. The problem was addressed using a two-stage stochastic program-
ming algorithm. The formulation allowed linking the consumer’s decisions
between the different stages in order to determine the consumer’s optimal
behavior. It was found that if an aggregator keeps the probability of call
close to zero then consumers reveal their truth information about energy
preferences. Hence, the main goal of the aggregator is to call randomly a
subset of users that meets the probability criterion and satisfies the energy
reduction requirement demand by SO.
A contract for incentive-based DR based on probability of call enables
to limit the gaming opportunities by making that a consumer buys his self-
reported baseline or pays his actual consumption if this one is greater than
his bid when he is not called to participate in DR. The user’s uncertainty
under this agreement motivates him to inform the truth of his preferences. In
addition, the model provides to the aggregator the limit allowed probability
to maintain a bounded deviation in user behavior. Therefore, the limitation
of gaming occurs beneath of threshold and its percentage is controlled by the
probability of call.
For future directions, a model to control the operation of an aggregator
that manages a portfolio of some incentive-based DR contracts which includes
indirect and direct control programs would be a significant improvement for
power management of a smart grid and assess the scope of the proposed
contract. Moreover, an important discussion would be to determine what
kind of technology is required for all agents to implement and ensure system
reliability in this agreement.
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Appendix A. Proof of the Theorem 1
Proof. The optimization problem is analyzed by cases due to the non-linearities
in the functions. Then several solutions are found according to the reported
information given by a user at Stage 1. Finally, results are compared and
then the global solution is determined. Considering the signal ri = 0, next,
the optimization problem is posed as follows:
q∗i,ri=0 = argmax
qi,ri=0∈{0,qmax,i}
Hri=0 = G(qi,ri; bi)− pmax(bˆi, qi)
Four cases are identified as results of payment function which is the maxi-
mum between reported baseline and actual energy consumption, and the two
parts of utility functions G(.) (see Def. 1). Cases are denoted by lowercase
letters. A optimization problem is formulated for each case according to its
conditions.
The case a) is assumed when reported baseline is greater than the actual
consumption, and the utility function is non-saturated, i.e.,
a) ri = 0, bˆi ≥ qi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ bi +
p
γi
, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=0 = argmax
qi,ri=0
Hri=0 = −
γi
2
q2i + [γibi + p]qi − pbˆi
s.t. − bˆi + qi ≤ 0
qi − bi − p/γi ≤ 0
− qi ≤ 0
The first-order optimality condition yields to
q∗i,ri=0 =
{
bˆi 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi + p/γi
bi + p/γi bi + p/γi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i
Next, the optimal payoff for this case is given by
H∗ri=0 =
{
− bˆi
2
γi
2
+ bibˆiγi 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi + p/γi
p2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
+ p(bi − bˆi) bi + p/γi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i
(A.1)
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Then the same condition but the utility function is saturated.
b) ri = 0, bˆi ≥ qi, qi > bi +
p
γi
, qi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=0 = argmax
qi,ri=0
Hri=0 =
p2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
+ pbi − pbˆi
s.t. − bˆi + qi ≤ 0
− qi + bi + p/γi ≤ 0
qi − qmax,i ≤ 0
The first-order optimality condition yields to
q∗i,ri=0 ∈ [bi + p/γi, qmax,i], bi + p/γi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i
Later, the optimal payoff for this case results to
H∗ri=0 =
p2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
+ p(bi − bˆi), bi + p/γi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i (A.2)
The case c) is assumed when reported baseline is lower than the actual
consumption, and the utility function is non-saturated part, i.e.,
c) ri = 0, bˆi ≤ qi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ bi +
p
γi
, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=0 = argmax
qi,ri=0
Hri=0 = −
γi
2
q2i + [γibi + p]qi − pqi
s.t. bˆi − qi ≤ 0
qi − bi − p/γi ≤ 0
− qi ≤ 0
The first-order optimality condition yields to
q∗i,ri=0 =
{
bi 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi
bˆi bi ≤ bˆi ≤ bi + p/γi
Next, the optimal payoff for this case is given by
H∗ri=0 =
{
γib
2
i
2
0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi
− bˆi
2
γi
2
+ bibˆiγi bi ≤ bˆi ≤ bi + p/γi
(A.3)
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Finally, the last case is when reported baseline is lower than the actual
consumption and the utility function is saturated.
d) ri = 0, bˆi ≤ qi, qi > bi +
p
γi
, qi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=0 = argmax
qi,ri=0
Hri=0 =
p2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
+ pbi − pqi
s.t. bˆi − qi ≤ 0
− qi + bi + p/γi ≤ 0
qi − qmax,i ≤ 0
The first-order optimality condition yields to
q∗i,ri=0 = bi + p/γi, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi + p/γi
And the optimal payoff results to
H∗ri=0 = −
p2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi + p/γi (A.4)
−
bˆi
2
γi
2
+ bibˆiγia)
−
bˆi
2
γi
2
+ bibˆiγic)c)
p2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
+ p(bi − bˆi)a)
γib
2
i
2
p2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
+ p(bi − bˆi)b)
d) − p
2
2γi
+
γib
2
i
2
0 bi bi + p/γi qmax,i
bˆi
Figure A.8: Comparison of optimal profits at Stage 2 when ri = 0.
Fig. A.8 shows the comparison of optimal payoff (A.1), (A.2), (A.3)
and (A.4). The final solution is found by selecting the maximum profit
according to the reported baseline. Red expressions in Fig. A.8 corresponds
to maximum values.
Finally, the optimal decision at the Stage 1 is drawn in Fig. A.9. The
result is given by Theorem 1.
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Figure A.9: Optimal solution at Stage 1 for ri = 0.
Appendix B. Proof of the Theorem 2
Proof. The procedure to solve the Stage 2 when ri = 1 is similar to Theorem
1. Although, the results are given by the reported baseline and the reduced
energy consumption under DR. The optimization problem is written as fol-
lows:
q∗i,ri=1 = argmax
qi,ri=1∈{0,qmax,i}
Hri=1 = G(qi,ri; bi)− [pqi − p2(bˆi − qi)+ + p3 |qi − qˆi|]
Since the problem is nonlinear then eight cases are identified but six of them
are feasible due to Assumption 4. Two parts of utility function G(.), two
combinations for incentive expression, and two regions in the penalty of de-
viation are taken into account in this analysis. All cases and their solutions
are listed below.
e) ri = 1, qi 6= qˆi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ bi + p/γi, qi ≥ bˆi, qi − qˆi > 0, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i,
0 ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=1 =
{
(bi −
p2
γi
)+ 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
p2
γi
, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi −
p2
γi
e) 1
bˆi bi −
p2
γi
≤ bˆi ≤ bi +
p
γi
, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi e) 2
H∗ri=1 =
{
b2
i
γi
2
− bip2 +
p2
2
2γi
+ qˆip2 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
p2
γi
, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi −
p2
γi
e) 1
p2qˆi − bˆip2 −
bˆi
2
γi
2
+ bibˆiγi bi −
p2
γi
≤ bˆi ≤ bi +
p
γi
, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi e) 2
(B.1)
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f) ri = 1, qi 6= qˆi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ bi + p/γi, qi ≤ bˆi, qi − qˆi > 0, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i,
0 ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=1 =


(bi −
2p2
γi
)+ bi −
2p2
γi
≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi −
2p2
γi
f) 1
bˆi 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
2p2
γi
, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
2p2
γi
f) 2
qˆi 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, bi −
2p2
γi
≤ qˆi ≤ bi +
p
γi
f) 3
H∗ri=1 =


2p2
2
γi
− 2bip2 + bˆip2 + p2qˆi +
b2
i
γi
2
bi −
2p2
γi
≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi −
2p2
γi
f) 1
p2qˆi − bˆip2 −
bˆi
2
γi
2
+ bibˆiγi 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
2p2
γi
, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ bi −
2p2
γi
f) 2
bˆip2 − p2qˆi −
qˆi
2γi
2
+ biqˆiγi 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, bi −
2p2
γi
≤ qˆi ≤ bi +
p
γi
f) 3
(B.2)
g) ri = 1, qi 6= qˆi, qi ≥ bi + p/γi, qi ≥ bˆi, qi ≤ qmax,i, qi − qˆi > 0,
0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=1 = bi + p/γi 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ bi + p/γi, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi + p/γi
H∗ri=1 =
γib
2
i
2
− p2bi −
p2
2γi
−
p2p
γi
+ p2qˆi (B.3)
h) ri = 1, qi 6= qˆi, qi ≥ bi + p/γi, qi ≤ bˆi, qi ≤ qmax,i, qi − qˆi > 0,
0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=1 = bi + p/γi bi + p/γi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi + p/γi
H∗ri=1 =
γib
2
i
2
− 2p2bi −
p2
2γi
−
2p2p
γi
+ bˆip2 + p2qˆi (B.4)
i) ri = 1, qi 6= qˆi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ bi + p/γi, qi ≥ bˆi, qi − qˆi < 0, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i,
0 ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i. Case i) is infeasible by Assumption 4.
j) ri = 1, qi 6= qˆi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ bi + p/γi, qi ≤ bˆi, qi − qˆi < 0, 0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i,
0 ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i
q∗i,ri=1 =
{
bi bi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, bi ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i j) 1
qˆi qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi j) 2
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H∗ri=1 =
{
bˆip2 − p2qˆi +
b2i γi
2
bi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, bi ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i j) 1
bˆip2 − p2qˆi −
qˆi
2γi
2
+ biqˆiγi qˆi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ bi j) 2
(B.5)
k) ri = 1, qi 6= qˆi, qi ≥ bi + p/γi, qi ≥ bˆi, qi ≤ qmax,i, qi − qˆi < 0,
0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i. As well, case k) is infeasible.
Finally, case l) is solved.
l) ri = 1, qi 6= qˆi, qi ≥ bi + p/γi, qi ≤ bˆi, qi ≤ qmax,i, qi − qˆi < 0,
0 ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, 0 ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i.
q∗i,ri=1 = bi + p/γi bi + p/γi ≤ bˆi ≤ qmax,i, bi + p/γi ≤ qˆi ≤ qmax,i
H∗ri=1 =
γib
2
i
2
−
p2
2γi
+ bˆip2 − p2qˆi (B.6)
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Figure B.10: Comparison of optimal profits at Stage 2 when ri = 1.
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Next, there are two local maxima when solution e) 1 and f) 1 are found
in the same feasible region. In order to find the global solution, the payoff in
cases e) 1 and f) 1 are compared. The critical value of bˆi that provides the
same payoff in both cases is:
b2
i
γi
2
− bip2 +
p2
2
2γi
+ qˆip2 =
2p2
2
γi
− 2bip2 + bˆip2 + p2qˆi +
b2
i
γi
2
,
Then solving for bˆi,
bˆi = bi −
3p2
2γi
Similarly, the same situation occurs for e) 1 and f) 3. The critical value
is renamed as α because depends on reported baseline bˆi and the announce
of reduced energy consumption qˆi. This value is found in Theorem 2.
Fig. B.10 presents the comparison of optimal payoff (B.1), (B.2), (B.3),
(B.4), (B.5) and (B.6). The final solution is found by choosing the maximum
profit accordig to bˆi and qˆi. Red expression in Fig. B.10 corresponds to
maximum values. The result is given by Theorem 2.
Appendix C. Proof of the Theorem 3
Proof. The results from Theorems 1 and 2 are substituted in Eq. (5) in
order to solve the optimization problem. Fig. C.11 presents the intersection
of strategies at Stage 2. Every crossing between results when ri = 0 and
ri = 1 in (5) is solved. Next, the outcomes are compared according to the
reported baseline and reduced energy consumption in order to determine the
global maximum. The final result is given by Theorem 3.
References
Antunes, P., Faria, P., Vale, Z., 2013. Consumers performance evaluation of
the participation in demand response programs using baseline methods.
2013 IEEE Grenoble Conference 2011, 1–6.
Bitar, E., Xu, Y., 2013. On incentive compatibility of deadline differentiated
pricing for deferrable demand. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control, 5620–5627.
Bizzozero, F., Gruosso, G., Vezzini, N., 2016. A time-of-use-based resi-
dential electricity demand model for smart grid applications. 2016 IEEE
16th International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering
(EEEIC), 1–6.
26
bˆi
qˆi
qmax,i
qmax,i
bi +
p
γi
bi
bi −
p2
γi
bi −
3p2
2γi
bi −
2p2
γi
bibi −
p2
γibi −
3p2
2γi
bi −
2p2
γi
strategyA strategyB strategy C
bi +
p
γi
strategy U
strategy V
strategyZ
strategyY
st
ra
te
g
y
W
st
ra
te
gy
X
Figure C.11: Intersection of feasible regions.
Bloustein, E., 2005. Assessment of customer response to real time pricing.
Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey, Tech. Rep, 1–23.
Buber, T., Gruber, A., Jochen Conrad, Buber, T., von Roon, S., Conrad,
J., 2013. Demand Response Potential of Electrical Heat Pumps and Elec-
tric Storage heaters. IECON 2013 - 39th Annual Conference of the IEEE
Industrial Electronics Society, 8028–8032.
Chao, H., 2011. Demand response in wholesale electricity markets: the choice
of customer baseline. Journal of Regulatory Economics 39 (1), 68–88.
Chen, Y., Lin, W. S., Han, F., Yang, Y. H., Safar, Z., Liu, K. J. R., 2012. A
cheat-proof game theoretic demand response scheme for smart grids. IEEE
International Conference on Communications, 3362–3366.
Deng, R., Yang, Z., Chow, M.-Y., Chen, J., 2015. A Survey on Demand
Response in Smart Grids: Mathematical Models and Approaches. IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics 11 (3), 1–1.
27
Diaz, C., Ruiz, F., Patino, D., 2017. Modeling and control of water booster
pressure systems as flexible loads for demand response. Applied Energy
204, 106–116.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.06.094
Dobakhshari, D. G., Gupta, V., 2016. A Contract Design Approach for Phan-
tom Demand Response. ArXiv e-prints 1611.09788 (November 2016), 1–16.
URL http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2016arXiv161109788G
Dobakshari, D. G., Gupta, V., 2016. Optimal contract design for incentive-
based demand response. American Control Conference, 3219–3224.
Fahrioglu, M., Alvarado, F. L., 2001. Using utility information to calibrate
customer demand management behavior models. IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems 16 (2), 317–323.
Faria, P., Vale, Z., Antunes, P., 2013. Determining the adjustment baseline
parameters to define an accurate customer baseline load. IEEE Power and
Energy Society General Meeting 2011.
Haring, T., Andersson, G., 2014. Contract design for demand response. IEEE
PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies, Europe 1, 1–6.
Ma, H., Parkes, D. C., Robu, V., 2017. Generalizing Demand Response
Through Reward Bidding. Proceedings of the 16th International Confer-
ence on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
Mathieu, J. L., Callaway, D. S., Kiliccote, S., 2011. Examining uncertainty in
demand response baseline models and variability in automated responses
to dynamic pricing. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control, 4332–4339.
Meir, R., Ma, H., Robu, V., 2017. Contract Design for Energy Demand
Response. ArXiv e-prints.
URL http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2017arXiv170507300M
Mhanna, S., Verbicˇ, G., Chapman, A. C., 2014. Towards a realistic implemen-
tation of mechanism design in demand response aggregation. Proceedings
- 2014 Power Systems Computation Conference, PSCC 2014.
28
Mohajeryami, S., Doostan, M., Schwarz, P., 2016. The impact of Customer
Baseline Load (CBL) calculation methods on Peak Time Rebate program
offered to residential customers. Electric Power Systems Research 137, 59–
65.
Muthirayan, D., Kalathil, D., Poolla, K., Varaiya, P., 2016. Mechanism De-
sign for Self-Reporting Baselines in Demand Response. In: American Con-
trol Conference (ACC), 2016. pp. 1446–1451.
Okajima, Y., Murao, T., Hirata, K., Uchida, K., 2014. Integration mecha-
nisms for LQ energy day-ahead market based on demand response. 2014
IEEE Conference on Control Applications, CCA 2014, 1–8.
Rajagopal, R., Bitar, E., Varaiya, P., Wu, F., 2013. Risk-limiting dispatch
for integrating renewable power. International Journal of Electrical Power
and Energy Systems 44 (1), 615–628.
Ramos, A., De Jonghe, C., Six, D., Belmans, R., 2013. Asymmetry of infor-
mation and demand response incentives in energy markets. International
Conference on the European Energy Market, EEM.
Roughgarden, T., 2016. Lectures Notes on Algorithmic Game Theory. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Samadi, P., Mohsenian-Rad, H., Schober, R., Wong, V. W. S., sep 2012.
Advanced Demand Side Management for the Future Smart Grid Using
Mechanism Design. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on 3 (3), 1170–1180.
Severin Borenstein, 2014. Peak-Time Rebates: Money for Nothing?
URL http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Peak-Time-Rebates-Money-for-Nothing
Su, C. L., Kirschen, D., 2009. Quantifying the Effect of Demand Response on
Electricity Markets. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 24 (3), 1199–
1207.
Vuelvas, J., Ruiz, F., 2015. Demand response: Understanding the rational
behavior of consumers in a Peak Time Rebate Program. in Automatic
Control (CCAC), 2015 IEEE 2nd Colombian Conference on, 1–6.
Vuelvas, J., Ruiz, F., 2017. Rational consumer decisions in a peak time rebate
program. Electric Power Systems Research 143, 533–543.
29
Wijaya, T. K., Vasirani, M., Aberer, K., 2014. When Bias Matters: An
Economic Assessment of Demand Response Baselines for Residential Cus-
tomers. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 5 (4), 1755–1763.
Zhou, D. P., Dahleh, M. A., Tomlin, C. J., 2017. Eliciting Private User
Information for Residential Demand Response. ArXiv e-prints.
URL http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2017arXiv170300972Z
Zhu, Q., Sauer, P., Basar, T., 2013. Value of demand response in the smart
grid. In: 2013 IEEE Power and Energy Conference at Illinois, PECI 2013.
pp. 76–82.
30
